Financial and Corporate Structure in South Africa by McKenzie, Rex A.
1 
 
 
 
 
Economics Discussion Papers 2016-5 
 
 
FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE STRUCTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA   
 
 Rex A. McKenzie  
  
Kingston University  
London, UK 
  
 
25 February 2016 
 
Abstract 
Concentration in the South African financial sector has its origins in three main influences 
that are all historical (i) the legacy of domination by a small number of large imperial banks, 
(ii) the struggle between English and Afrikaner capital and (iii) the statutory legislation that 
framed the operation of banks. In this paper we describe the part played by these three 
historical influences in the formation and development of the corporate sector in South 
Africa. One recurrent theme throughout the history is the relative position of the foreign bank 
and domestic bank in the local market place. We take up this theme and argue that the scale 
and extent of foreign bank operations in South Africa is far greater than estimates provided 
by the local authorities. We have found that the main vehicle in deepening the concentration 
of the sector has been the merger. In later sections of the paper we lay out how the 
amalgamation by absorption approach to expansion that has been a constant feature of the 
country’s business life comes together with a merger frenzy in the late 1980’s and 1990s that 
succeeds in further deepening concentration within banking, finance and industry. Last, we 
end with an analysis of industry structure by Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
capitalisation between 1994 and 2011. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The most obvious feature of South Africa’s corporate and 
financial life is its large size and concentration. The entire 
corporate structure of South Africa is characterised by this 
concentration and in what follows we explain this tendency as 
a product of South Africa’s historical development.  
 
The pattern was established towards the end of the 19
th
 century 
when in 1888 Cecil Rhodes’ DeBeers completed what Chabane et 
al (2006) call the “amalgamation” of the diamond industry in 
the region. In 1917, Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) was 
founded by Ernest Oppenheimer. Capital for its formation came 
from Britain, the US, and South Africa. The company aimed to 
exploit the gold mining potential of the East Rand. In 1924, 
Oppenheimer made AAC the largest single shareholder in De 
Beers and established a cross-holding linking the two 
companies in 1929. This type of cross listing that connects 
companies in an intricate web of shareholdings was the sine 
qua non of corporate South Africa up until the corporate 
unbundling and re-bundling of the 1990s. The huge banking 
conglomerates are part of a larger conglomerate structure that 
has emerged from the unique circumstances of South Africa’s 
past. 
 
2.  Measuring Concentration 
According to Okeahalam (2001), the number of firms that supply 
products in a market and the proportion of the market that 
each firm supplies determines concentration. Concentration in 
turn is said to indicate the degree of competition to be found 
in an industry.  
 
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (H-index) measures the market 
concentration in a banking system. An H-index from 0.1 up to 
0.18 indicates no concentration to moderate concentration. An 
H-index above 0.18 speaks to heavier and higher levels of 
concentration. The H-Indices for the South African banking 
sector for the years 2006-2011 are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: South Africa Bank Sector H-Index, 2006-2011 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
0.184 0.190 0.189 0.189 0.188 0.187 
Source: SARB Overview 2011 
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According to the Falkena Report of 2004; “the concentration 
levels of the South African banking industry are high, but not 
out of line with other emerging markets.” This we believe is 
half the story, in that it is not just the high levels of 
concentration in banking and finance. It is the concentration 
in finance alongside very high levels of concentration across 
the economy, in mining, energy and other sectors tied to the 
fact that South Africa is one of the more financialised 
countries in the world that makes South Africa a fairly unique 
case. The South Africa Reserve Bank (SARB) attributes the high 
level of concentration within its system to the high 
concentration of banking assets among South Africa’s big four 
banks
1
. The big four – Standard Bank, ABSA, First Rand Bank and 
Nedbank account for just over 84 per cent of aggregate banking 
assets in the system
2
. 
Fig 1: Banks by Total Assets 
 
Source: SARB, 2011, Overview 
 
Concentration in the South African financial sector has its 
origins in three main influences that are all historical: 
 
1. The historical legacy of domination by a small number of 
large imperial banks 
2. The struggle between English and Afrikaner capital 
3. Statutory legislation that framed the operation of banks 
                                                          
1
  See Bank Supervision Department Annual Report 2011, Pg 55 
2
 If we include Investec as many writers are increasingly doing we in effect a “big five” that hold over 90% 
share of total assets in the bank sector.  
 
The Standard Bank of
SA
ABSA
FirstRand Bank
Nedbank
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In the rest of this paper we describe the part played by these 
three historical influences in the formation and development 
of the corporate sector in South Africa. One recurrent theme 
throughout the history is the relative position of the foreign 
bank and domestic bank in the local market place. We take up 
this theme and argue that the scale and extent of foreign bank 
operations in South Africa is far greater than estimates 
provided by the local authorities. We have found that the main 
vehicle in deepening the concentration of the sector has been 
the merger. In later sections of the paper we lay out how the 
amalgamation by absorption approach to expansion that has been 
a constant feature of the country’s business life comes 
together with a merger frenzy in the late 1980’s and 1990s 
that succeeds in further deepening concentration within 
banking, finance and industry. Last, we end with an analysis 
of industry structure by Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
capitalisation between 1994 and 2011. 
 
We find that a fair degree of continuity remains between the 
two periods. By JSE capitalisation the largest industrials 
(including mining), still account for six of the top 20 firms 
(including services). Continuity is also reflected in 
continued high levels of concentration within sectors. A large 
proportion of mergers have been vertical, increasing control 
of dominant firms through production chains. While this avoids 
the direct competition concerns of horizontal mergers, it 
realizes greater consolidation within industries.  
 
3. Imperial Domination: 
 
One of the main influences in determining the structure of 
South African finance is the imperial legacy; British banks 
were an integral part of British imperialism and as such they 
occupied dominant positions in the local economy since the 
1860’s. When Barclays Bank acquired National Bank in 1926, 
Verhoef (2009) contends that the final domination of the 
British banks was complete. And notwithstanding the formation 
of Volksas in 1934 and the expansion of the Netherlands Bank 
for South Africa, by 1970 South Africa’s banking sector was 
still dominated by Standard Bank and by Barclays with Head 
Offices in the United Kingdom. Both banks were headquartered 
in the United Kingdom and both represented British interests. 
Starting in the Cape Colony, the banks followed the gold 
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mining industry.  By 1910 the two owned and controlled over 
90% of the total capital of banks in South Africa (Verhoef 
2009).  
 
By the early 1930s AAC’s 1929 cross listing of companies with 
DeBeers secured dominance within the mining industry. Starting 
with Rhodes’ amalgamation mining too had evolved as a highly 
concentrated sector. Oppenheimer’s AAC competed with five 
other mining companies. According to Chabane et al (2006), “the 
(limited) backward linkages created by the mining industry and 
the demand for consumer goods generated by white wage earners 
provided a stimulus for industrial development.” According to 
the authors, it was at this point the mining houses saw the 
opportunity for diversification into related activities. The 
mining houses diversified into explosives and mining 
equipment, banking, industrial commodities (steel, paper, and 
chemicals), engineering, and consumer goods (including beer 
and furniture). By the end of this process the each mining 
house had its own financial arm and it is here that Innes 
(1984) argues that productive capital and financial capital 
were in effect married. O’Meara (1983), reports that this 
model was to define Afrikaner capital for some considerable 
time thereafter.  
4. English and Afrikaner Capital 
The 20
th
 century began with Afrikaner nationalism in retreat. 
For the first two decades of the 20
th
 century saw a huge 
increase in the number of poor whites, and in addition English 
capital enjoyed an unchallenged position in industry. There 
were many significant responses. One such was the creation of 
Santam (the South African Trust and Insurance Company). Santam 
was founded in 1918, and Sanlam the South African National 
Life Assurance Company) was formed in the same year as its 
life assurance subsidiary.  
According to Verhoef (2009: 124-5), Sanlam’s was established 
with three objectives; 
1. to contribute to the growth of the South African economy; 
2. to encourage and facilitate Afrikaner saving; and  
3. to strengthen Afrikaner (participation in the South 
African economy.  
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Another significant response was the formation a people’s 
savings bank by the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1934. The savings 
bank later became Volkskas Bank, (up until 1991, South 
Africa’s largest Afrikaner bank) 3 . In due course these 
institutions became crucial vehicles of Afrikaner capitalism 
and nationalism.  
The economy wide tendency to conglomeration was reinforced at 
the Economic People’s Congress in Bloemfontein in 1939, when 
Sanlam advanced the formation of an investment company that 
would provide capital for Afrikaner business. ‘If we want to 
be successful, we need to use the capitalist system in a 
similar fashion as displayed by the gold mining 
industry.’(Verhoef 2009a: 128)  
The FVB (Federale Volksbeleggings or Federal People’s 
Investments) was established with Sanlam having a controlling 
shareholding and overlapping members of the board of 
directors. Through FVB, Sanlam was critical in channelling 
Afrikaner savings and agricultural surplus into the 
development of an ‘Afrikaner’ industrial base (O’Meara 1983 in 
Ashman and Fine, forthcoming).  
The state established the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) in 1940, and in 1949 the state established the National 
Finance Corporation (NFC). The NFC used its deposits to 
purchase the state’s Treasury Bills and the debentures of the 
mining houses. Here were the early beginnings of the long term 
capital market and the one of the earliest beneficiaries was 
the Orange Free State Goldfields (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). 
The scale and scope of the development could not be undertaken 
without the involvement of the NFC.  
As the NFC matured it established a mechanism for moving funds 
from AAC’c diamond operations to the company’s mining 
interests. As this practice takes root, the finance role, 
moves from private sources to institutional ones.  In addition 
Ashman and Fine (ibid) point out this change ultimately helps 
to erode differences between English and Afrikaner capital. 
Further support from the state for Afrikaner finance capital 
during the 1940s and 1950s, meant that Afrikaner capital was 
able to break the stranglehold that English capital had 
imposed on the economy.  “Minerals and energy then were the 
                                                          
3
  In 1991, Volkskas merged with United Bank, Allied Bank and Trust Bank to form Amalgamated Banks of 
South Africa. 
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vehicles through which Afrikaner capital integrated into the 
industrial core of the economy” (ibid). A critically important 
strategy was the creation of state owned sectors in 
electricity, steel, chemicals and fuels.  Fine and Rustomjee, 
1996, point out that these state owned sectors complemented 
the mining conglomerate needs and provided a growing link 
between the state and the private sector.  
Bonuskur was founded by Sanlam in 1946. “Bonuskor took the 
bonuses of policy holders and invested them in shares in 
listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange.“(ibid).Bonuskur along with FVB established their own 
mine holding company Federale Mynbou Beperk or FM (Federal 
Mining Limited) in 1953 and it was FM that broke the English 
hegemony in coal, gold and asbestos and became “.... 
increasingly interested in diamonds, eventually co-operating 
with Anglo-American, through Genmin, though AAC wanted to 
ensure FM’s operation in diamonds came under the De Beers 
Central Selling Organisation.
i
FM eventually controlled Genmin 
and in 1974 Genmin took over the Union Corporation Company, a 
British owned gold mining company, creating Afrikaner control 
of the second largest gold mining house, renamed Gencor in 
1975 (Jones 1995; O’Meara 1983). “ 
Verhoef (2009, 133) chronicles FVB development into an 
industrial holding company that by the 1970s managed nearly 30 
industrial enterprises. The capital market remained small 
relative to European standards, and foreign capital and 
internal financing by mining houses remained important (Ashman 
and Fine, ibid). 
The last important development in the story of Afrikaner 
capital in South Africa is the growth of the 
investment/merchant banking sector. In 1955, AAC established 
its own investment bank-Union Acceptances Limited. By 1968 
Union owned assets approaching R145 million which made it the 
largest investment bank in the country. Another major entity 
established during this period was Volkskas Trustbank. 
Volkskas in particular grew as a result of close links with 
the National Party who transferred the accounts of state 
corporations and municipalities to the bank. 
Ashman and Fine (forthcoming) describe the growth in some 
detail: 
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The very rapid growth of merchant banking from the late 
1950s onwards, under conglomerate control, reinforced the 
close connection between finance and industry. A major 
series of mergers increased concentration in the economy, 
including financial ones, most importantly those led by 
Anglo’s Union Acceptance Limited which merged with Syfrets 
Trust Co. owned by insurance firm the South African Mutual 
Life Association Society (later to become Old Mutual) and 
which was backer of Anglo’s Rand Mines which merged with 
manufacturing conglomerate Tomas Barlow to form Barlow Rand 
in 1971. The combined group then merged with the originally 
Dutch owned Nedbank Group (then the third largest commercial 
bank) to form in 1974 Nedsual (Nedbank and Syfrets-UAL 
Holdings). Three groups, Standard, Barclays and Nedsual thus 
dominated banking with Volksas in fourth place and both 
Anglo and Old Mutual had expanded significantly into 
finance, especially given Anglo retained a minority stake in 
both Barclays and Standard. Anglo then took over the 
Schlesinger financial group so gaining controlling stakes in 
Eagle Life Assurance and Western Bank (7
th
 largest) and 
Sorec Ltd (second largest property company) (Innes 1984). 
All the major finance groups had significant industrial and 
property holdings with the exception of Standard/Liberty 
Life which remained purely financial. 
5. Key Pieces of Legislation: 
 
Legislation has helped to define the structure and the form of 
competition which prevails in South African finance. The 1965 
Banks Act No. 26, classified banks in functional form, 
commercial banks, merchant banks, hire purchase banks, etc. 
Commercial banks were viewed by the SARB as the only ones with 
money creating capabilities and therefore in the face of an 
ongoing money supply expansion were subject to liquid assets 
and capital reserve requirements. In addition, the commercial 
banks were required to keep interest free deposits to cover 
their liabilities with the SARB. Thus, legislation itself 
framed competitive conditions in which commercial banks were 
severely disadvantaged.  
 
The SARB too has played a pivotal role in the development of 
the South African banking sector. The SARB in defining 
ownership and setting the limits to competition induced a 
response from the commercial banks which saw them diversifying 
their traditional bank functions into new areas such as hire 
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purchase, leasing and other short term credit facilitates. 
More importantly, the commercial banks sought to circumvent 
central bank’s onerous restrictions by;  
a. Acquiring majority ownership of other financial 
intermediaries that specialised in the exempted areas. 
b. Establishing their own subsidiaries to carry out such 
functions. 
In so doing: “Commercial banks succeeded in expanding their 
traditional bank operations through subsidiaries and gaining a 
grip on the competition by other financial intermediaries.” 
Thus as Verhoef (ibid) points out by the first half of the 
1980’s South Africa’s bank sector was dominated by five large 
consolidated banking groups; First National Bank Group, 
Standard Bank, Nedcor, Bankorp and Volkskas. Each group had at 
least one entity specialising in commercial, general, 
merchant, industrial and/or hire purchase banking. “The sheer 
size of the bank groups and the number of subsidiaries within 
groups reduced competition effectively” (ibid). 
 
6.  Franszen – the importance of nationally owned banks 
 
Another aspect of the recent past material to the structure of 
the industry today is the Franszen Commission Report finding 
in 1970. The Commission found that that the foreign domination 
of the bank sector contained an inherent threat to the 
security of the country. The Report proposed that “foreign 
shareholding in South African banks in excess of 50 per cent 
should be gradually reduced to a minority position” (ibid). 
 
Legislation would follow in 1976 restricting foreign share 
ownership in South African banks. Commenting on these 
developments Itzikowitz was to observe: "Since the Franszen 
Report in 1970 monetary and fiscal policy attempts have been 
made to control the size of single shareholding in banks. 
These have been motivated by economic xenophobia and its 
historical corollary – fear of concentration of power in a few 
large organisations
4
" 
  
To understand these developments properly one has to recall 
that South Africa operated its peculiar apartheid system in an 
increasingly hostile world. As Verhoef (2009, 172)  observes, 
                                                          
2. A. Itzikowitz, "The Deposit-taking Institutions Act, 94 of 1990: Its history and overview of its main 
provisions", South African Mercantile Law Journal, 4, 1992, p 181
 
in Verhoef, 2009. 
 
10 
 
“This was not only a fear of concentration per se, but also a 
fear of foreign control of a strategic sector of the economy 
of a country in a hostile international environment.”  In 
terms of the wider global tendency towards financialisation, 
as direct non market controls over banks were replaced by 
indirect market mechanisms, the South African monetary 
authorities moved in unison with the rest of the world; 
however in placing restrictions on the foreign ownership of 
bank capital, the authorities restrictions were in effect, 
placing restrictions on the free flow mobile capital in the 
industry. This is sharply at odds with what was taking place 
in the rest of the world and is a peculiarly South African 
feature of the past. 
 
7. De Kock Commission Deregulation and Liberalisation 
 
The De Kock Commission was established in 1978 and it produced 
three reports. The first in 1979 sought an end to exchange 
controls. The second assessed the relative positions of the 
building societies and financial markets in general. The third 
produced in 1985 signalled a sea change in South African 
monetary affairs by replacing direct regulatory controls with 
“market determined mechanisms” which were to serve as 
controls. In effect this 1985 Report aligns South Africa with 
the then new global tendency towards marketisation and 
financialisation.  
 
De Kock’s recommendations were embodied in the Financial 
Institutions Amendment Act, Nº 106 of 1985. In addition and in 
keeping with the Banque for International Settlements (BIS) 
directives, more stringent capital adequacy rules were 
applied, and tellingly the Act removed the distinctions 
between the different types of banking institutions. What 
resulted was increased competition right across the spectrum 
of banking services. The new post De Kock competitive 
environment squeezed interest margins and induced rapid 
product innovation (DT Merett in Verhoef, 2009, 176). 
 
In terms of ownership, banks could only be owned by bank 
holding companies or by other banks, and changes in ownership 
were placed under the sole purview of the Registrar of Banks. 
According to Verhoef (2006, 165), “The rationale behind these 
restrictions was to prevent "undesirable concentration of 
economic power, credit privileges, bank captivity and a 
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conflict of interests that result from banks and bank holding 
companies’ control over non-bank enterprises". For the most 
part this was the thinking that informed the SARB’s opposition 
to mergers of banks and insurance companies. Of course such 
opposition was to be drowned out in the deluge of global 
deregulation which was to follow in the middle of the 1980s. 
 
In an effort to cut unit costs in the more competitive post De 
Kock environment the banks were motivated to embark on a 
programme of rapid computerisation that required increased 
capital investment. Further diversification of banking 
services as well as a marginal decline in concentration are 
the chief features of this period. 
 
The Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, Nº 94 of 1990, brought 
South Africa further into line with BIS thinking. New 
prudential requirements were introduced in conformity with 
Basle requirements for risk management and all deposit-taking 
institutions were subject to uniform capital adequacy, minimum 
reserve balances and liquid asset requirements.  
 
According to Verhoef (2009), the 1990 legislation aimed, "to 
create a framework for the regulation, including the 
supervision, of the business of accepting and employing 
deposits of the general public.”5  
 
In summary, the 1985 and 1990 legislation stipulated: 
 
 All banks were to have sufficient capital 
 All banks were to be owned by registered banks or by 
registered bank holding companies 
 No shareholder was allowed to own more than 10 per cent 
of the shares issued by any one bank without the 
permission of the Registrar of Deposit Taking 
Institutions
6
 
 
Although foreign banks were not allowed to conduct any 
business in the Republic, the South African banking sector 
                                                          
5
 A. Pienaar, "The prudential requirements of the Deposit Taking Institutions, Act 94 of 1990", Tydskrif vir Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg, 3, 1992, pp 475 
 
6
 If the total shareholding was to exceed 30 per cent, permission from the Minister of Finance was required. 
According to Verhoef (ibid), “These ratios were raised in 1992 to 15 per cent for registrar’s permission and 49 
per cent for ministerial permission,44 thereby perpetuating a high degree of concentration in the bank sector.” 
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became linked the rest of the world through the contingent 
liabilities on its balance sheet.  It was the Banks Act, Nº 94 
of 1990 that gave the statutory approval for the return of 
foreign banking interests in the form of Representative 
Office(s). The Representative Office (RO) of a foreign bank 
was not permitted to carry out the business of a fully fledged 
bank; however the a RO gave foreign finance a toe hold towards 
re-entry. While the 1985 Bank Act sought to eliminate the 
differences between banking institutions and building 
societies the 1990 legislation extended the process by doing 
away with the distinction between the local or foreign 
domicile of shareholders. The only restriction that remained 
was that on the maximum holdings of shareholders. 
 
8.  Mergers 
 
Verhoef (2009) argues that the concentration through 
absorption of subsidiaries in bank holding companies was 
encouraged by two developments in the mid 1980’s. First, there 
was Standard Bank’s decision to disinvest in 1986, and then 
the 1987 Bank Act removal of the statutory differentiation 
between banks and building societies.  
 
A train of mergers and acquisitions followed.  Standard Bank 
(by equity the largest of the banks with a market 
capitalisation of R29.7 billion) was wholly acquired by South 
African interests in 1987
7
.  
 
It was then Barclays turn: Barclays PLC sold its remaining 
40.4 per cent shareholding in Barclays of South Africa. The 
bank was renamed First National Bank and constituted the 
largest of the bank groups with assets of R30.3 billion in 
1989. Anglo American Corporation, Southern Life Association 
and De Beers Consolidated Mines all featured as buyers. The 
large consolidated bank group had begun to emerge. The process 
continued, in 1988 Nedbank merged with the permanent building 
society and Finansbank. Old Mutual owned 52 per cent of the 
shareholding of the Nedcor Group. Trust Bank, established in 
1956, was the commercial bank in the Bankorp Group, of which 
Sanlam held 66 per cent of the shareholding.  
 
Volkskas group was the fourth largest of the bank at the end 
of the 1980s with assets of R3,595 million. When the 
                                                          
7
 Among the new owners were Liberty Life, Old Mutual, Rembrandt and Gold Fields of South Africa 
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distinction between bank institutions was removed Volkskas and 
the largest and oldest building society in South Africa, the 
United Building Society, exchanged shareholdings. Volkskas 
obtained 30 per cent shares in the building society and United 
10 per cent of shares in the bank in 1987. 
 
In January 1991 the largest single bank group was formed in 
South Africa, Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA). ABSA 
was the result of a merger of the Volkskas group, the former 
United Building Society, the Allied Bank and the Sage Group. 
The rationalisation deal was worth R1.7 billion. Finally in 
February 1992 ABSA acquired the Bankorp group from Sanlam and 
ABSA group controlled assets in excess of R80 million. 
 
Building societies were the natural targets for banks once the 
demutualisation process of the mid-1980s got underway. By the 
end of the 1990s they were all absorbed into one or other of 
the large bank groups. The demutualisation of the large 
insurance companies started with Southern Life in 1985 and was 
followed by Old Mutual and Sanlam in 1998.  After 1998, Sanlam 
consciously realigned its business to financial services and 
sold its controlling shareholding in ABSA.   
 
In 1997 First Rand Group was established as a joint holding 
company for Rand Merchant Bank, Rand Merchant Bank, First 
National Bank, Southern Life Assurance Company and Momentum 
Life.  
 
9. Mergers across Corporate South Africa 
 
Complex cross-holdings and pyramid type ownership structures 
served big business well from Harry Openheimer’s 
diversification of AAC in 1927 until the 1980s and 1990s. 
These mechanisms reinforced the control of the families and 
bolstered Chandler’s (2004) notion of personal capitalism. 
Starting in the 1980’s with the ascendancy of the maximisation 
of shareholder value approach, new imperatives emerged that 
prioritised the need for effective management that would 
maximise the return to the shareholder
8
. According to Chabane 
et al (2006), “Conglomerate unbundling and restructuring to 
ensure stronger focus and better strategic direction 
                                                          
8 As Chabane et al, point out, “In general, conglomerates were trading significantly below their net 
asset value—22% in 1995 in the case of AAC.” 
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represented a fundamental shift in the managerial mindset of 
South Africa’s richest individuals and the corporations they 
controlled.” Thus, while the South African Merger and 
Acquisition (M&A) frenzy that was to follow coincided with the 
same event in the rest of the world, its motivations arise 
from peculiarly South African origins. 
 
The M&A activity in South Africa, was started by Gencor in 
1993 when it disposed of a range of non-mining assets and 
created Billiton. According to Chabane et al; “Barlow Rand, 
now called Barlow, followed suit by focusing on “brand 
management”—among its main businesses are Caterpillar and 
Hyster fork-lift truck dealerships—and greatly reducing its 
exposure to the domestic market. The majority of unbundling 
(and related “rebundling” or consolidation within sectors) 
deals took place in 1999, when there were 60 of such deals 
(accounting for R80 billion) compared with 40 deals in 1998 
and 17 deals in 1997.” 
 
When this process began in the early 1990s, ownership and 
control of large South African companies rested with the big 
conglomerates.  But by 2005 this unity had been split, control 
now resides with an new class of managers who actually run the 
company on a day to day basis.  Today, institutional fund 
managers comprise the largest group of shareholders on the 
JSE.  
 
10.  Internationalisation of the South Africa Finance 
Conglomerate South Africa has always argued for exchange 
control liberalization and overseas listings. The rationale 
has always been that this would allow South African firms to 
raise capital more cheaply in international capital markets, 
and this in turn would increase investment in South Africa. 
Most fundamentally, liberalization would encourage inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Gelb (2001), notes that both 
private investment and inward FDI have remained low and Rashid 
(2011) points out that, “South Africa is the only large 
emerging economy (and the only BRICS country) where net inflow 
of portfolio investment is higher than FDI inflows. In 2010, 
the ratio of portfolio investment to FDI was nearly 10 (SARB 
sources).” 
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Starting in the late 1990s, big conglomerates moved their 
primary listings overseas. New valuations in hard currency 
eradicated the foreign exchange risk of a Rand holding thereby 
reducing risk premia and improving expansion capabilities. 
According to Chabane et al (ibid), the first important issue 
was by Billiton, (currently the world’s largest mining 
company). Billiton was listed by Gencor on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) in 1997. SAB followed in early 1999 and since 
then has taken advantage of its larger liquidity by acquiring 
breweries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.  
 
When SAB merged with Miller to create the world’s second 
largest brewery, Altria (previously Philip Morris) has become 
SABMiller’s single largest shareholder with 23.5%. “... by far 
largest and most evocative, listing was Anglo’s. In October 
1998, AAC absorbed Minorco and simplified its highly complex 
ownership structure. Following the London listing in May 1999, 
AAC joined Billiton and SAB in the FTSE 100 index. Old Mutual 
and Liberty International have also obtained primary London 
listings, as have two infotech companies, PQ Holdings and 
Datatec. In 1999, Sappi, though still with a primary JSE 
listing, had secondary listings in four foreign stock 
exchanges; 52% of its shareholders and ¾ of its assets were 
abroad and 85% of earnings in hard currency.” (ibid) 
 
International listings have been used to access liquidity that 
has funded a pattern of aggressive outward foreign investment 
and acquisitions by corporate South Africa.  Firms like SAB, 
Sasol, and Sappi have also been involved in acquisitions, 
joint ventures, and greenfield investment in Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and 
other emerging markets; outward FDI has grown from $8.7 
billion in 1995 to $28.8 billion in 2004 (Goldstein, 2006). In 
addition the number of South African companies doing business 
in Africa, has more than doubled since 1994. 
 
The pace and scale of the international listings process 
ignited concerns about conglomerates’ motivations and the 
benefits and costs to South Africa led the Government to 
reconsider its approach, In February 2000, the Government 
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published new criteria for future cases.  Since then overseas 
listings have been few and far between
9
.  
 
It is quite clear that South Africa’s conglomerates enhanced 
their ability to raise new capital more cheaply through the 
overseas listing. It also seems clear that they ... “have 
generally found relationships with investors, analysts, and 
financial and accounting regulators more demanding than in 
their home country, where companies such as AAC or SAB were 
used to dictating the terms of engagement.”  If as Rashid 
(2011) speculates, “One should expect considerable political 
influence of the financial sector given the sector’s share of 
national income in South Africa. It is almost universally true 
that larger the share of a particular sector in the economy, 
the more deferential the economy is likely to be to the 
demands of that sector.”And if as Chabane et al advance, “the 
increased autonomy of firms with overseas listings and the 
increased proportions of conglomerates’ revenues coming from 
overseas activities,” weakens the leverage of the South 
African authorities, the state would be considerably less 
influential in its ability to regulate the conglomerates.  
 
The internationalisation of the South African bank sector 
proceeded in its own specific manner contrary to what has been 
observed in many other developing countries. Rather than the 
foreign banks deploying in South Africa the overarching 
tendency was for South African Banks to extend their 
operations overseas in an effort to serve South Africa’s 
conglomerates that were deploying resources overseas.  
Almost as soon as permission was granted in 1997 ABSA, 
Investec Bank, First National Bank, Nedbank, Standard Bank and 
Rand Merchant Bank followed their customers and sought to 
acquire overseas interests. One of the first moves by all the 
banks was to establish offices in off shore tax centres like 
Mauritius, Guernsey, Jersey, the British Virgin Islands and 
the Grand Cayman.  
 
By 2011, South African banks had migrated to many far flung 
parts of the world including Canada, the USA, Ireland, Hong 
                                                          
9 One notable exception is Investec. In November 2001 the Government granted Investec permission 
to list overseas. The financial services group, which was then earning 60% of its revenues outside 
South Africa, was given the go-ahead on condition it kept its headquarters in Johannesburg (see 
Chabane et al, 2006). 
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Kong, Malta UK, Hong Kong, Liberia, the United Arab Emirates 
and Russia. Australia  Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, as 
well as in the People’s Republic of China, Singapore, Germany, 
Switzerland Italy, Iran, India and Turkey. One notable trend 
in the expansion of operations has been an expansion into 
other countries in Africa that started around the turn of the 
century and has continued unabated. Today South African banks 
operate in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Uganda, Nigeria, the DRC,  
Angola and other African countries. 
 
As Verhoef (2009, 192) puts it; “The ability of South African 
banks to extend operations on such a scale, was testimony to 
the sophistication of their management, the strength of their 
capital base and the confidence of both the domestic clients 
they followed into global markets, and the international 
clients doing business in South Africa. Globalisation of bank 
operations was as much a function of the size and level of 
experience and expertise of the banks as of the soundness of 
domestic central bank regulation.” 
 
11. Foreign Banks 
 
Today, by comparison with other BRIC and emerging market 
countries, the South African economy has a very large presence 
of foreign banks (Rashid, 2011). According to the World Bank 
financial sector database
10
, banks that are 50% or more 
foreign-owned controlled nearly 30% of the banking sector 
assets. This is contrary to the data report in the 2011 Annual 
Report of the South African Reserve Bank, which claims that 
foreign banks and their branches control only 6.1% of the 
banking sector assets. 
 
The Banks Act, Nº 94 of 1990, allowed foreign banks to re-
enter the local market. In the period 1992-2005 the number of 
foreign banks authorised to establish representative offices 
(RO’s) in South Africa rose from 31 (at the start of the 
period) to 61 (in 2000), but then declined to 43 in 2011 (See 
Table 1). The representative offices were not fully fledged 
banks, they did not engage in in the full range of bank 
operations, rather they were specialist institutions providing 
a presence for foreign banks seeking to enter the market or 
                                                          
10 Barth, James R. Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross Levine (2001, updated 2008). “The regulation and supervision of 
banks around the world - a new database“. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 2588 
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they specialised in providing economic and trade information 
to select clients.  
 
In 1992 the nationality of the representative offices 
operating in South Africa was largely European. By 2011 
American, Canadian, Chinese, Japanese as well as European and 
other banking interests from a total of 22 countries were all 
represented. 
 
It was the Banks Amendment Act, Nº 26 of 1994 that finally 
opened South Africa to the entry of foreign banking 
institutions as banks, licensed to conduct banking business. 
As South Africa entered the 1990’s we find that all the banks 
were subjected to a single set of regulations and crucially 
foreign banking competitors were allowed to enter the market.  
The imperial legacy remained in the form of the domination of 
the big four commercial banks (the two former imperial banks 
along with Nedbank and Volkskas). 
 
The number of fully fledged branches of international banks 
registered in South Africa rose from 4 in 1995 to 15 in 2005 
declining to 12 in 2011. Making up this number are ABN Amro 
Bank NV, Bank of Baroda, Citibank, Commerzbank 
Aktiengesellschaft, Credit Agricole Indosuez, ING Bank NV, 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and Société Généralé. 
 
Table 2:  South Africa’s Registered Bank Sector 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Banks* 30 22 20 19 19 19 19 18 17 17 
Mutual Banks 2 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Branches of 
international 
banks in the 
Republic of 
South Africa 
14 15 15 15 14 14 14 13 13 12 
Representative 
offices 
52 44 43 47 43 46 43 42 41 43 
Controlling 
companies 
27 19 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Banks under 
curatorship 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banks in 
receivership 
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banks in final 
liquidation....... 
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Includes active banks and banks exempted by the Registrar of Banks (with effect from 1 July 1996) in terms of the Supervision of Financial 
Institutions Rationalisation Act, 1996 (Act No. 32 of 1996) and section 1(cc) of the Banks Act, 1990. Source: SARB 2011 Overview 
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Two significant developments took place in the middle 2000’s; 
first in 2005 Barclays Bank PLC obtained controlling share 
ownership in ABSA. Thus ABSA became a subsidiary of Barclays. 
This was the first acquisition by a foreign bank of a large 
South African bank in terms of section 37 of the Banks Act, Nº 
94 of 1990, and it required the approval of the Minister of 
Finance himself. Then in 2006 the Chinese entered the South 
African market with two banks, China Construction Bank 
Corporation and Bank of China Ltd
11
. 
 
Foreign banks in South Africa are principally involved in 
specific areas like investment banking or trade finance. They 
generally service the corporate sector. According to the Task 
Group Report for the National Treasury and the South African 
Reserve Bank (in Verhoef, 2009, 186) “they did not succeed in 
penetrating the retail sector. The main reason for this 
development was the regulatory environment: foreign banks are 
required to be separately capitalised with South Africa and be 
structured as subsidiaries of foreign holding companies rather 
than as branches
12
. This is not the case in many industrialised 
countries where ‘home-country’ regulation applies.” 
 
 
Between 2004 and 2007 (expressed as a percentage of GDP), the 
claims of foreign banks vis-à-vis the South African private 
sector increased from 14% to 42%. This entailed huge credit 
expansion that Rashid (2011), estimates was in excess of USD 
90.0 billion. Looked at over the period foreign lending would 
appear to be strongly pro-cyclical. With the onset of the 
Great Recession of 2008, foreign banks reduced their exposures 
in South Africa by approximately USD 20.0 billion in the year 
between December 2007 and December 2008. “As a percentage of 
GDP, the contraction in credit from foreign banks was as large 
as 7% of GDP, compared to 2.5% and 0.87%, 0.89% contraction in 
foreign bank lending in Brazil, China and India respectively.” 
 
The foreign banks in South Africa appear to be more risk 
averse compared to their domestic counterparts. We have also 
established that foreign bank lending to the domestic economy 
                                                          
11
 Both moves taken together confirm the relative attractiveness of South Africa as a destination for 
international banking capital. 
12
 There is no restriction on foreign bank entry into South Africa through acquisition, subsidiary or branch 
operation. 
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can be strongly pro-cyclical. And from experience around the 
world we know that foreign banks in general tend to avoid 
lending to small and medium sized enterprises in the 
developing countries because of the problems of information 
asymmetry (Stiglitz, Rashid). Given that foreign banks 
specialise in consumer and trade credits,(especially credit 
for imports of consumer goods), and given too that the banks 
in South Africa do not face any restriction in capital market 
activities, it suggests that these banks engage in equity 
trading activities, where they earn a  higher return from non-
lending activities.  
 
12.  Domestic Banks 
In keeping with the historical legacy, in the contemporary 
period from 1990 to 2011, the domestic banking landscape has 
been dominated by the big four. Their assets as proportion of 
assets of all bank assets rose from 70 per cent in 1995 to 
82.2 per cent in 2007 to 89 percent at the end of 2011
13
. 
With respect to ownership, 43 per cent of issued banking 
shares are held by foreigners with 28 per cent being held by 
domestic shareholders. The remaining 29 per cent of shares are 
held by the “small” shareholder who owns less than 1 per cent 
of the total issue. 
Figure 2 
 
Source: SARB, 2011, Overview 
                                                          
13
 Verhoef (2009) and SARB, 2011, Banking Sector Overview 
Per Cent Sharehoding in S Africa Bank 
Sector 
< 1%
Domestic
Foreign
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13. Structure by JSE Capitalisation 
  
In order to determine changes in the structure of corporate 
South Africa, Chabane et al, (ibid), undertook a comparison of 
the rankings of the top 100 listed companies in 1994 with 
those of 2004. The significant conclusions are as follows: 
 
1. Confirmation that a radical restructuring has occurred. 
Only 41 of the top 100 listed companies in 1994 were 
still ranked ten years later.  
2. In 1994, 83 of the top 100 companies were owned or 
controlled by the top six conglomerates. By 2004, the 
number of companies controlled by these conglomerates had 
fallen to 47.  
3. The importance of the top conglomerates remained 
significant. Albeit listed separately, three of the top 
20 (Anglo American, Amplats, and AngloGold) were still 
effectively part of the Anglo group in 2004. Of the top 
20 companies in 2004, 13 were part of a major 
conglomerate grouping. 
4. Foreign-controlled firms in the top 100 increased from 
five in 1994 to 11 in 2004. The authors attribute this to 
both internationalization in the ownership structure of 
South African firms now listed abroad and acquisitions of 
local firms by international companies.  
5. Although black ownership increased over the period, it 
did so unevenly and marginally as only five companies 
under black control were in the top 100 in 2004. 
6. With regard to the change in sectoral composition of the 
top 100 over the period, there is a mixed picture. The 
authors find that the number of firms engaged in 
financial, retail, and other services increased 
significantly. These firms include MTNSA, Netcare, Pick n 
Pay, and Edcon. Banking and insurance companies emerge as 
particularly important and account for seven of the top 
20 in 2004, including the demutualized Old Mutual and 
Sanlam. 
7. A fair degree of continuity remains between the two 
periods as the largest industrials (including mining), 
still accounts for six of the top 20 firms, even 
including services. 
8. Continuity is also reflected in continued high levels of 
concentration within sectors. A large proportion of 
mergers have been vertical, increasing control of 
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dominant firms through production chains. While this 
avoids the direct competition concerns of horizontal 
mergers, it realizes greater consolidation within 
industries. Vertical integration can yield efficiency 
gains such as from the internalization of transactions 
costs but can also increase barriers to entry, make 
collusion easier to maintain, and lead to foreclosure of 
competitors (Riordan and Salop, 1995). 
 
Table three (below) extends the Chabane et al (ibid) measure 
of control by adding data on the market capitalisation 
shares by group for selected years from 2004 onwards.  
Foreigners (corporations and other), dominate the JSE by 
market capitalisation. Foreign controlled interests now 
account for 30% of JSE capitalisation, far more than any other 
group on the exchange. 
 
Table 3: Summary of control of JSE market capitalisation (% of total)14 
Group 1985 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2006 2011 2012 
Foreign 5.9 2.1 2.2 3.9 10.1 18.5 20.8 29.8 30.0  
Institutions   0.9 4.2 9.1 10.3 9.1 17.0   19.4 
Directors 8.1 6.7 7.0 14.4 7.4 5.8 6.7 8.9     9.2 
SABMiller     4.0 5.1 5.7 7.5     9.2 
Anglo American Corp 53.6 44.2 43.3 17.4 20.2 18.7  21.0 11.8     8.9 
Rembrandt/Remgro 3.8 13.6 13.0 9.0 10.0 7.9 7.8 5.2     7.2 
Black Groups
15
    9.6 3.5 6.3 5.1 4.6     3.9 
RMB/FirstRand   0.5 4.8 4.7 4.9 3.9 3.1     3.9 
SA Mutual/Old Mutual 10.6 10.2 9.7 8.8 12.0 4.5 5.5 2.9     3.3 
Sanlam 12.2 13.2 10.5 11.1 6.3 2.7 2.3 1.2 1.4 
Liberty Life/Standard 
Bank 
2.0 2.6 7.2 9.5 6.0 4.7 3.5 2.4 1.1 
Bidvest Group    1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.8     0.9 
Investec   0.4 3.3 1.9 0.8 1.2 0.6     0.7 
PSG          0.6 
State      2.2 2.0 0.2     0.1 
Altech         0.1     0.1 
ABSA          2.2    
Sasol   1.7 2.2 3.8 4.2 4.6 3.9  
Anglovaal
16
 2.1 2.5 3.6 0.8      
TOTAL 100  100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100 
Source: McGregor’s (1999, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011) Who Owns Whom 
Foreign control and dominance has proceeded through capital 
inflows, (especially portfolio flows) and South Africa with 
                                                          
14
 Control is assessed by McGregor’s taking into account the various cross-holdings of shares that exist and may 
be associated with a relatively small direct shareholding in any given company.  
15
 The Black owned groups are identified as such by McGregor’s on the basis of all those companies which have 
significant black influence in their ownership. 
16
 In 1998 the Anglovaal shareholding was split equally, giving the Hersov and Menell families each control over 
0.4% of the JSE capitalisation. 
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its sophisticated stock exchange is something of a magnet for 
hot money flows (particularly during periods of uncertainty. 
Foreign direct investment has also played its part, most 
notably the R30-billion deal by Barclays to become the biggest 
shareholder in ABSA
17
.  
Unbundling by the big conglomerates has served as a vehicle by 
which foreign and institutional investor’s have extended 
control. The Competition Commission (2008) reports; 
“Conglomerate groupings still dominate the JSE. The market 
share of the 6 big conglomerates has continued to shrink ... 
This however does not take into account other companies owned 
or controlled by these conglomerates. Despite unbundling by 
the major conglomerates they are still ‘remarkably 
significant, with their overall size being increased by 
international acquisitions and mergers, such as to create BHP-
Billiton and SAB-Miller.”The number of merger notifications to 
the Commission increased substantially between 2001 and 2007. 
Most mergers during this period occurred in the manufacturing 
sector and in financial services and real estate sector. 
According to the Commission, the number of mergers in the 
agriculture and mining sector has grown dramatically ... 
broadly in line with the commodity price boom. The number of 
conglomerate mergers
18
, where the products produced by the 
merging parties do not compete directly with one another, has 
increased significantly over the period (Competition 
Commission, 2008).  High concentration, coupled with low 
levels of competitive rivalry, results in supra-competitive 
prices. Associated with this is that existing dominant firms 
are able to create barriers to entry and enjoy abnormal 
profits. 
 
Table 3 records that in 2012 SAB-Miller replaced AAC as the 
largest listed company by market capitalisation. This is a 
notable development because it would be the first time in the 
history of the exchange that market capitalisation would be 
dominated by any other company but AAC. Whether it signifies a 
deeper more meaningful change remains to be seen. 
                                                          
17
 According to Competition Commission (2008), this has been critical in the increase of foreign ownership on the 
JSE.  
 
18 Conglomerate mergers are neither horizontal nor vertical. These are mergers between firms with 
complementary products, neighbouring products, and unrelated products (Competition Commission, 
2008). 
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Conclusion 
 
The structure of banking in South Africa has been shaped by 
the history, competition and legislation. Although the 
circumstances have changed conglomerate concentration 
reproduces itself from period to period and despite 
unbundling, cross-holdings linking company with company remain 
essential features of the arena just as they were in 1929.  
 
By far the most important change has been in the 
internationalisation of local banking. When taken together 
with the dominance in the corporate market makes it clear that 
South African finance is in large part propelled by foreign 
interests. 
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i
  A confidential letter (cited in Verhoef 2009a:141) from Anglo’s Harry Oppenheimer to the 
chairman of the FM board stated that should FM ‘or any other company over which it 
exercised effective control (including General Mining) make any new diamond discoveries or 
were invited to hand any new diamond venture, such discovery or venture would be offered 
in the first place to a new company to be formed for that purpose, and the capital of the new 
company would be owned 51 per cent by De Beers and 49 per cent by Federale Mynbou.’   
